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Venomous Dinosaurs and Rear-Fanged Snakes: Homology and Homoplasy Characterized 
Forthcoming in Erkenntnis 
Abstract 
I develop an account of homology and homoplasy drawing on their use in biological inference and 
explanation. Biologists call on homology and homoplasy to infer character states, support adaptationist 
explanations, identify evolutionary novelties and hypothesize phylogenetic relationships. In these 
contexts, the concepts must be understood phylogenetically and kept separate: as they play divergent 
roles, overlap between the two ought to be avoided. I use these considerations to criticize an otherwise 
attractive view defended by Gould, Hall, and Ramsey & Peterson. By this view, homology and homoplasy 
can only be delineated qua some level of description, and some homoplasies (parallelisms) are counted as 
homologous. I develop an account which retains the first, but rejects the second, aspect of that view. I 
then characterize parallelisms and convergences in terms of their causal role. By the Strict Continuity 
account, homology and homoplasy are defined phylogenetically and without overlaps, meeting my 
restriction. Convergence and parallelisms are defined as two types of homoplasy: convergent homoplasies 
are largely constrained by external factors, while parallelisms are due to internal constraints.  
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I Introduction 
On one hand the biological world is wildly diverse, on the other surprisingly conservative. Mammalia alone 
boasts naked mole-rats, giraffes, whales and coendous (arboreal porcupines sporting prehensile tails); 
platypus, orang-utan, horseshoe bats and aye-ayes. The range of forms and behaviour is bewildering. Yet 
nothing is unique: whales retain vestiges of their ancestor’s quadrupedal lifestyle; all mammals are hairy, 
milk-provisioning and back-boned. Moreover, the naked mole rat’s strange eusocial lifestyle echoes that 
of ants and termites; the platypus’ electroreception is found in many fish; the orang-utan’s remarkable 
puzzle-solving is rivalled by kea. Point to some putatively unique trait in a lineage and I will find it in 
another. A central task of evolutionary biology is accounting for the diversity and conservatism of 
organismic form and function in an historical context. In virtue of what facts about their pasts are 
lineages similar and different? This paper is about the similarities. In particular, I discuss a cluster of 
concepts which biologists use to characterize and explain similarities between and within organisms. 
These concepts, ‘homology’, ‘homoplasy’, ‘convergence’, ‘parallelism’, and so on, are essential for the 
work of biologists and increasing amounts of philosophical ink are spilled on them. This paper presents 
an original approach to capturing these concepts, and a new view. 
As a rough first pass, let’s consider two explanations a biologist might give for some similarity between 
two organisms. Why do Cetacea have similar skeletal features to land-based mammals? Because cetaceans 
and terrestrial mammals share a common ancestor who had those features, and they inherited them. Call 
this ‘homology’. Why do platypus and shark share electroreception? Because their ancestors lived in 
environments which faced similar problems – how do you locate prey in the dark? And their ancestors 
found similar solutions, they independently evolved electroreception. Call this ‘homoplasy’. I have presented 
these as (1) contrasting phylogenetic concepts: two similar traits are homologous just in case they are present 
in the most recent common ancestor; homoplastic just in case they are not present in the common 
ancestor; (2) explanations of similarity in biological form. I ultimately defend a view similar in spirit, if not 
in detail. 
I start by clarifying the paper’s approach and situating it in current debate. 
I focus almost exclusively on four concepts: homology, homoplasy, convergence and parallelism. Convergences 
and parallelisms are, by my account, two types of homoplasy. Roughly, if two lineages independently 
evolved similar traits from different starting points, or utilizing different developmental resources, they 
are convergent; if the traits evolved from similar starting points, or utilizing similar developmental resources, 
they are parallel. There are other concepts, such as ‘analogy’, ’atavism’, ‘reversal’ and so on, which are 
relevant to the discussion at hand but, to avoid laborious definitions, I ignore.  
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I should say something about methodology. Many philosophers tackling homology and homoplasy take 
an explicitly historical perspective. They are in part interested in capturing how these concepts were 
understood in the 19th Century, and tracing the development of those ideas (Griffiths and Hall, for 
instance). This is a worthy approach, but it is not mine. I am interested in understanding homology and 
homoplasy in terms of their epistemic roles. I want to track not what scientists say about them, or how they 
were used in the past, but their use in a contemporary, justificatory, context. When scientists call on 
homology or homoplasy, what kinds of inferences and explanations are they concerned with, and what 
account makes the most sense of those epistemic roles?  
An important dispute about homology concerns its role in individuating biological traits. Griffiths (1994, 
2006) and Amundsen & Lauder (1994) argue that relations of homology (ancestry) are the best 
determinate of organismic traits. Neander & Rosenberg (Neander 2002, Rosenberg 2006, Neander & 
Rosenberg 2009) argue instead that selective role function is indispensable for delineating characters. In 
this paper I do not take a stand on this debate – I am interested in understanding homology, homoplasy 
and so on in terms of how they are used once traits are individuated. I take the two interests to be 
complimentary and hopefully everything I say conforms both to a homology-first or function-first 
approach to character delineation. 
I should briefly mention two accounts of homology and homoplasy. The taxic or geneological account 
conceptualizes them as I have above: two traits between sister clades are homologous if and only if they 
are held by their most recent common ancestor. As put, this definition fails to account for serial 
homologues (my left and right hands are surely homologous, but as they are part of the same organism 
they cannot be homologous by this definition); and fails for homologues between ancestor-descendent 
pairs (surely my hands and my father’s hands are homologous, but we are not in sister-clades). I think of 
homology as a relation of inheritance, but not as put by the taxic account. The developmental account of 
homology (Wagner 1994, Brigandt 2007) holds that two traits are homologous just in case they are the 
products of the same developmental process. This view is unsatisfactory because, as Hall demonstrates, 
homologous traits can arise from different developmental processes. The challenge facing 
characterizations of homology and homoplasy is to find an account which can play these various roles. 
As I have said, I am interested in homology and homoplasy in terms of their epistemic roles in 
explanation and inference. Another approach understands homology as an explanandum rather than an 
explanans. For instance, Griffiths (2007) suggests that homology is an ‘investigative kind’: a robust 
phenomenon demanding explanation. He sees biological categorization as a descriptive (rather than 
explanatory) project which captures a phenomenon (homology). Explaining homologous patterns is a 
requirement of any complete biological science. He takes homology and homoplasy as I discuss them to 
be explanations of ‘homology’ as an investigative kind. He is a pluralist about the developmental and taxic 
account of homology as they are complementary explanations of homologous phenomena. The 
hierarchists (see below) and I present non-pluralistic accounts.  
4 
 
With this focus in mind, in section II I consider four epistemic uses homology or homoplasy. This 
grounds a restriction on accounts: on pain of undermining their epistemic roles, homology and 
homoplasy must be understood phylogenetically, and kept distinct. In section III I discuss a view 
proposed by Hall (2012, 2007, 2003) and Gould (2002) and developed by Leander (2008) and Ramsey & 
Peterson (2012). The position has two main tenets: (1) attributions of homology or homoplasy can only 
be made qua some level of description; (2) homoplasy is disjunctive (some homoplasies are homologous, 
and others not). I agree with the first, and resist the second part of the claim. Finally, Section IV presents 
a new view of homology and homoplasy. Importantly, this involves an account of parallelisms which both 
retains their homoplastic status and illuminates their epistemic role. 
Before getting to the paper proper, there are two issues I want to partly sideline. First, are homologous 
traits are the same or merely similar? Ramsey & Peterson argue vigorously for a ‘sameness’ reading against 
Rosenberg & Neander’s (and others) ‘similarity’ reading1. So far as I can tell, whatever hangs on this 
disagreement does not affect my arguments herein. In formulating my view I will remain agnostic to 
either reading. Second, one might worry that this discussion is merely semantic in the pejorative sense. 
For instance: does the disagreement between myself and Hall collapse into mere labelling? I believe it 
does not. At the very least, such labelling reflects scientific concepts, and getting this right matters. Second, 
I take it that one route to asserting ontological or epistemic claims is through what works in scientific 
practice. I think much of what follows demonstrates this. 
In a nutshell, my approach is to argue for a restriction on accounts of homology and homoplasy in 
section II, use that to object to the hierarchical account in section III, and then build on that discussion 
for my own account in section IV. 
II The epistemic role of homology and homoplasy 
Homologous and homoplastic relationships, understood in phylogenetic terms and strictly delineated, 
play an important role in biological epistemology. A satisfactory account of homology and homoplasy 
must retain those roles. In this section I sketch four roles and explain how they motivate the restriction. 
For different epistemic tasks, biologists sometimes consider homology as noise and homoplasy as signal, 
and vice-versa. In splitting the evidential wheat from the chaff, we often divide along 
homoplastic/homologous lines – and this motivates keeping them distinct. One reason to care about this 
distinction is that an otherwise attractive view, the hierarchical, violates it. 
I first characterize the use of homology and homoplasy in inferring the traits of lineages. Both homology 
and homoplasy play roles here, but on different justifications. Second, I turn to the uses of homology and 
                                                          
1
 To an extent I attribute this to Rosenberg & Neander because Ramsey & Peterson do. I don’t think many 
philosophers before Ramsey & Peterson have taken talk of homology as ‘the same’ trait, versus homology as 
‘similar’ traits particularly seriously. In Rosenberg & Neander’s paper they do make some claims about similarity: 
“… similarity judgements, or at least specifications of the traits or characters judged to be homologous, are prior to 
homology claims (330).”  
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homoplasy in adaptationist explanation: accounting for some contemporary trait in terms of selection 
pressures in the past. As we shall see, homologous relationships play a framing role, while homoplastic 
relationships count as evidence. Third, I discuss the role of homology in identifying novel traits. Fourth, I 
cover the role homology plays in inferring shared ancestry. In each case, a phylogenetic conception is 
utilized, and overlaps between homology and homplasy would undermine their epistemic use. 
I illustrate these uses in reference to Enpu Gong and colleagues (2009)’s argument that a small, feathered 
species of microraptor, Sinornithosarus, was venomous. Gong et al see the morphological features of 
Sinornithosaurs dentition as indicative of a venomous delivery system. They have unusually long (saber-
toothed) maxillary teeth, extra space on the maxillary bone which could have accommodated a venom 
gland, and a supradental groove along the maxilla which they interpret as “represent[ing] the location of 
small venom reservoirs (3).” Their justification for taking these morphological characters as indicative of 
venom are analogies with venomous organisms with similar features. Opisthoglyphous (rear-fanged) 
snakes and squamate lizards have similar maxillary teeth and similar jaw structures. The space on the 
maxillary bone is interpreted as a venom gland on the basis of morphological similarities with these 
contemporary reptiles. Opisthoglyphous snakes and rear-fanged lizards deliver venom via poison mixing 
with saliva from their ducts. The force of the bite delivers the poison, rather than the ‘injection’ system 
seen in vipers. Rear-fanged snakes and lizards typically use venom to weaken, rather than kill, prey: the 
poison makes the victim easier to control. On this basis Gong and colleagues make further claims about 
the ecology and behaviour of the microraptor, suggesting that the poison fangs are an adaptation to a 
bird-eating lifestyle:  
… the long fangs in Sinornithosaurus… evolved to penetrate a covering of feathers and… it was 
largely a predator on feathered taxa… (2011, 110)  
And so, from analogy with extant animals we have claims about Sinornithosaurus’ morphology, behaviour, 
ecology and adaptive history: 
… Sinornithosaurus was a venomous predator that fed on birds by using its long fangs to penetrate 
through the plumage and into the skin, and the toxins would induce shock and permit the victim 
to be subdued rapidly (1). 
Gong et al may be drawing a long bow here – but it is not the truth or otherwise of Gong et al’s position 
that I am concerned with. Rather, it is the use of the comparative method they apply. 
Homology & Homoplasy in trait-inference 
Homologies and homoplasies are used to infer the presence or otherwise of traits. Paleontologists draw 
on comparisons between extant (and occasionally other extinct) lineages to put meat on fossilized bones. 
In systematics the characteristics of common ancestors are reconstructed on the basis of contemporary 
morphological patterns. The characteristics of contemporary but inaccessible animals, such as those in the 
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deep seas, are inferred on the basis of comparisons with lineages we can access (see Currie & Levy 
(forthcoming)’s discussion of Colossal squid). As we shall see, both homologies and homoplasies can help 
here, but do so on the basis of different justifications. 
In their 2009 paper, Gong et al do not take a stance on whether the common ancestor of microraptors 
and Opisthoglyphous snakes had a venom-delivery system. Let us consider the status of their inference if 
the relationship is homoplastic or homologous on taxic grounds. In both situations, the inference moves 
from some match between a morphological trait (say, long maxillaries) to another (venom) in one lineage, 
to project that onto another lineage where the first trait is known, but the other is not. It might help to 
put this in some schematic form. 
Take two lineages, call one a ‘model’ lineage, the other the ‘target’ lineage. We use the model lineage to 
reconstruct the target lineage, based on the similarities between the model and the target. We wish to 
discover whether the target lineage exhibits some character – call it character1, and investigate on the basis 
of a similarity between the model and the target lineage, in some other character – character2. Here is the 
basic structure: 
1. In the model lineage, character1 and character2 are coupled 
2. The target lineage exhibits character1 
3. Projections are justified: if character1 and character2 are coupled in the model lineage, then they 
most likely will be in the target lineage 
4. Most likely, the target lineage exhibits character2 
Opoisthoglyphous snakes have venom and long maxillary fangs, and Sinornithosaurus has long maxillary 
fangs. Assuming that we can project from Opoisthoglyphous snakes to Sinornithosaurus, then given that 
coupling in the snake, we should expect the dinosaur to be venomous. So, what does the homoplastic or 
homologous nature of the similarity between snake and dinosaur have to do with the inference? How 
premise 3 is justified turns on these relations. 
If the characters are homologous, the traits are basal: the common ancestor of the two lineages used 
maxillary fangs to deliver venom – and this was inherited. The inference is justified if it is more likely that 
the function and morphology of the teeth remain stable across generations, rather than shift by (say) drift 
or exaptation. If, for instance, we have reason to think that the trait is especially labile, then we might 
doubt the inference. If it is entrenched, we should be happy (in Currie & Levy (forthcoming) this is called 
a ‘phylogenetic inference’ made on the basis of ‘phylogenetic inertia’). 
If the characters are homoplastic, two lineages evolved the maxillary fang-venom coupling independently. 
The justification of the projection here does not turn on the robustness of inheritance (at least not 
primarily – see section IV). It rather turns on our confidence in regularity: the relationship between 
maxillary teeth and venom in an evolutionary context. If there is selection for Opisthoglyphous venom-
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delivery, then (most likely) long maxillary teeth will evolve. Or perhaps, if long maxillary teeth have 
evolved, this is most likely to accommodate Opisthoglyphous venom-delivery.  
The justification for the inference (premise 3) differs depending on the ancestral relationship. If a 
homology is proposed, then the inference is justified on common ancestry and phylogenetic inertia. If a 
homoplasy is proposed, then the inference is justified on grounds of a coupling between two traits given 
some selective regime. 
In an illuminating exchange, Gianechini et al (2011) criticize Gong et al, and they reply (2011). I focus on 
the comparative aspects of the discussion. As stated, Gong et al cite three traits as evidence for their 
microraptor’s venom: (1) elongated teeth which could deliver venom; (2) labial grooves suggestive of 
venom ducts; (3) ‘ornamentation’ (extra space) on the maxillary bone which could accommodate venom 
glands. Gianechini et al object to each piece of evidence. 
To (1) they point out that “… extremely elongated maxillary teeth are also observed in other therapod 
taxa… without any evidence of connection with a venom delivery system (104)”; for (2) they claim “… a 
wide variety of therapods, pertaining to distantly related clades, exhibit labial grooves… However, none 
of these therapods exhibit other evidence of venomous adaptations (104-105); and finally for (3) “... an 
almost identical ornamentation is also present in the antorbital and “subfenestral” fossae of other 
dromaeosaurids… but their dentition is considerably different from that of Sinornithosaurus (105).” In each 
case, they draw attention to the presence of characters 1-3 in non-venomous lineages. 
Why do Gianechini et al care so much about the distribution of traits 1-3? Presumably Gong et al refer to 
rear-fanged snakes in order to infer, on the basis of homoplasy, that long fangs evolve to accommodate 
venom. By showing that other lineages have that trait, but are not venomous, this is undermined. The 
counter-examples to the analogy between Opoisthoglyphous snakes and microraptors suggest we cannot 
project from the coupling of long fangs and venom in the snake, to the dinosaur’s fangs being indicative 
of venom. Of course this assumes that Gong et al are thinking of the relationship as homoplastic: they cite 
the snakes as an independent data-point for the regular coupling of that teeth morphology and venom, 
and this is swamped by many cases of the same morphology without the venom. 
Gong et al’s response is surprising: 
Apparently… venom was present at the base of the lepidosaur [snakes and lizards] radiation, and 
might be expected in a sister group… Gianechini et al. (2010) make a fundamental error by 
assuming that archosaurs with grooved teeth had no venomous taxa in their ancestry and were 
not venomous themselves... We have no way to conclusively prove that any of the animals with 
labial tooth grooves were not venomous and, considering recent studies of lepidosaurs, might 
reasonably expect them to be (109) 
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This is ambiguous between two readings. Perhaps Gong et al claim that Gianechini and company err by 
thinking they infer from a homoplastic relationship between lepidosaurs and Sinornithosaurus, when they 
propose a homologous relationship instead. The common ancestor of the two clades was venomous. 
Another reading claims there is good reason to see poison as a particularly ‘evolvable’ trait in that clade. It 
is ‘easy’ for snakes, lizards and dinosaurs to evolve venom (see Brown 2013 & Sterelny blah for 
discussions of ‘evolvability’). This suggests the trait is parallel. I will concentrate on the first reading and 
return to the latter in section IV. Taking the inference as made on the basis of homology changes Gong 
et al’s claim dramatically. First, it is not restricted to Sinornithosaurus, but many of its sisters: venom should 
be common in these dinosaurs. Second, reference to lepidosaurs is not as an independent homoplastic 
data-point but as a homologous ancestral relationship. Sinornithosaurus inherited its venom from ancestors 
common with snakes. A long bow indeed! 
Whatever we think of their response, it is clear that understanding it requires contrasting homoplasy and 
homology along taxic lines – to make sense of the dispute we need the distinction.  
And so, when inferring the status of traits using the comparative method, ascertaining the homologous or 
homoplastic status of target and model is essential. If the relationship is homologous, the inference relies 
on the shared ancestry of the trait. If homoplastic, it relies upon selection’s ability to shape the trait in 
regular ways. These inferential structures depend on retaining the kind of distinction we see in the taxic 
account. If venom is homologous in Sinornithosaurus and opisthoglypous snakes, then the reconstruction is 
based upon common ancestry; if it is homoplastic, then it relies on common selective environments. 
Blurring the line between homology and homoplasy blurs the line between these two kinds of inferences. 
As we shall see in section IV, some homoplastic inferences in part rely on underlying homologous 
developmental resources, but this should not lead us to claim they are homologies.  
Homology & Homoplasy in adaptive hypotheses 
Currie (2012a) discusses the evidential role homoplasy plays in adaptive hypotheses. Here I sketch this, 
and emphasize the role of homology. As we shall see, homologous relationships ‘frame’ adaptive 
hypotheses by setting the appropriate descriptive and temporal level of inquiry; while homoplastic 
relationships count as evidence for that data. 
Gong et al claim Sinornithosaurus’ venom and fangs were adaptations. They aided in bird hunting by 
weakening prey. Their lengthened maxillary fangs reach the bird’s flesh through thick feathers. The 
inferential structure here moves from a morphological trait (Opoisthoglyphous venom) and a function 
(weakening prey) in one lineage (Opoisthoglyphous snakes), to infer that same function, given that same 
morphological trait in a different lineage (Sinornithosaurus) (Currie 2012a calls this an ‘organism to world’ 
analogous inference). This has the same basic structure as I describe above. However, adaptive 
hypotheses rely on homology and homoplasy in special ways. Note the hypothesis has competitors. The 
venom could have evolved for some other purpose. For instance, it has been suggested that the venom of 
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the male platypus has evolved due to male-male competition for mates. The venom could have evolved 
before the lineage actually began hunting birds. Consider what we make of Gong et al’s adaptationist 
hypothesis if the trait is homologous or homoplastic. 
If it is homoplastic, then (by hypothesis) Opoisthoglyphous snakes have independently evolved long maxillary 
teeth and venom. This counts as evidence of adaptive function in the dinosaur. That some other lineage 
evolved venom in order to weaken prey gives us some reason to think that this occurred in Sinornithosaurus. 
But what if they are homologous? If so, then the claim that the venom evolved to weaken prey depends on 
the function of the venom in the common ancestor. Imagine that in the common ancestor the poison 
evolved for a different purpose. Perhaps the venom was a sexually selected trait as has been suggested for 
platypus. The use of venom in Sinornithosaurus would then be an exaptation, rather than an adaptation as 
Gong et al claim. Hunting birds does not explain the evolution of venom, and Sinornithosaurus’ bird 
hunting is not validly inferred from its venom.  
Homology is important because claims about the adaptive function of traits depend upon timing. If I claim 
that some trait x evolved to solve environmental problem y, then a restriction on this claim is that x in 
fact evolved in the presence of y – and homology can test for this. If venom and long maxilliary teeth are 
homologous between Opisthoglyphous snakes and Sinornithosaurus, and the common ancestor did not live 
in a ‘using venom to weaken prey’ niche, then the venom didn’t evolve for that purpose. And so in this 
sense homology ‘frames’ adaptive hypotheses: attending to homology helps us decide which questions to ask 
in adaptationist contexts. 
Gong et al defend their adaptive claims as follows: 
Our speculation involving long fangs in Sinornithosaurus having evolved to penetrate a covering of 
feathers and the possibility that it was largely a predator on feathered taxa is unaffected by their 
[Gianenchini  et al’s] comments. Feathers make such a thick keratinous covering that shorter 
teeth would have been unsuccessful. In a situation in which a deep tearing wound was difficult to 
achieve, addition of poison may have been favoured (110). 
In other words, the selective environment of bird-eating favours long fangs and venom. Whether or not this is 
true, Gong et al have missed an important point here: if indeed venom or long fangs are basal in these 
lineages, then their having evolved for that purpose turns not on the derived environment which 
Sinornithosaurus lived in, but rather the basal environment: what did the common ancestor use them for? 
Wings did not evolve to swim even though penguins use them for swimming.  Even if Gong et al are 
right that Sinornithosaur fangs were exapted for feather-penetration, they cannot establish that the trait 
evolved to penetrate feathers. 
Again, the use of the comparative method in testing adaptationist hypotheses turns on capturing the taxic 
conception of homology and homoplasy. An adaptationist hypothesis relies upon a correlation between 
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the trait’s evolution and the environment it supposedly evolved in response to – and homology, but not 
homoplasy, tests for this as it can help us identify when the trait evolved. An adaptationist hypothesis relies 
upon the plausibility of the trait in question’s evolution in response to the hypothesized environment – 
and homoplasy, but not homology, can support this. 
Homology and novelty 
Evolutionary Developmental Biology (evo-devo) mechanistically explains the evolution of novel traits. 
When new traits, such as turtle shells, the digits of tetrapods, and perhaps Sinornithosaurus venom evolved, 
which developmental changes occurred?  A standard account of novelty says that some trait is novel just 
in case it is not homologous (West-Eberhard 2003, Hall 2005, Brigandt & Love 2012). 
A novelty (whether structure, function, or behaviour) is a new feature in a group of organisms 
that is not homologous to a feature in an ancestral taxon (Hall 2005 p549) 
If Sinornithosaurus’ venom is not homologous in basal microraptors, then it is an evolutionary novelty – 
and thus a target of evo-devo explanation. If it is present, then it is not novel, and so not a target. 
Unsurprisingly, there are conceptual issues here: how ‘novel’ must a feature be? Even if ancestral taxon 
did not have long fangs, they certainly had fangs – is the gradual lengthening of maxillaries worthy of an 
evo-devo explanation? I am not interested in providing a complete account of novelty here, but 
(following Hall) suggest that indexing the potential novelty to some level of description is at least a start. 
Take the scenario where Sinornithosaurus’ venom is not present in recent ancestors, but (say) similar 
developmental resources are utilized. In this case, the ancestors are, say, ‘proto-venomous’ – they exhibit 
preconditions for venom’s evolution. Here, there might not be novelty at the level of developmental 
pathways (as developmental homologues exist), but novelty at the phenotypic level. As stated this is not 
completely satisfactory (for instance, are Sinornithosaurus fangs novel qua ‘being long’, but not as ‘fangs’? 
Should we divide the levels that finely?), but nonetheless novelties-as-non-homologues is a promising 
account for Evo-Devo.  
Here we do not see a taxic conception of homology and homoplasy, as the relationship holds between 
ancestor-descendent pairs rather than sister clades, but nonetheless taking novelties as non-homologues 
requires that we identify homology strictly and phylogenetically. If the feature (qua some level of 
description) is present in the ancestor of the lineage in question, then it is no novelty – if it is not, then it 
is. Although the taxic account identifies homologues in sister clades, not ancestor-descendent pairs, it still 
turns on a phylogenetic and discrete account of the concept. 
Homology and shared ancestry  
To determine ancestral relations, homoplastic noise must be divided from homologous signal. Cladistic 
phylogenetics infers patterns of ancestry via statistical analysis of patterns of similarity, allowing diagnoses 
of homology and homoplasy. This is true in a molecular context, as seen in neontology, and in 
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morphological contexts as utilized by palaeontologists. Roughly speaking, if two traits are homologous 
they may be used to trace the common ancestry of lineages, if they are homoplastic then they may not. 
That penguins and terns have wings is good evidence that they are related via a winged ancestor; that 
terns and bats have wings is not. 
Consider cases where cladistic analyses are ‘swamped’ by homoplasy. In deciding which traits give good 
signals of common ancestry, we must control for labile traits, or those with high selection pressure, as 
they are likely to re-evolve. Hall (2007), for instance, discusses Lockwood (1999)’s study of platyrrhine 
monkeys. The frequent homoplastic evolution of adaptations for climbing undermined the use of those 
characters in setting phylogeny: 
This is a situation where a predominant behaviour (climbing) is such a strong selective force that 
homoplasy becomes a dominant source of the shared similarity in data sets based on characters 
reflecting that behavioural/selective force (Hall 2007, pp 475). 
Controlling for swamping illustrates the importance of keeping taxic homology and homoplasy separate 
in phylogenetic analyses. Again, an account of those concepts must respect that distinction.  
A restriction on accounts of homology and homoplasy 
A satisfactory account of homology and homoplasy respects a strict divide between homology 
and homoplasy along taxic lines: if, between two sister clades, the trait in question is present in a 
common ancestor, then it is homologous; if it is not present in a common ancestor, then it is 
homoplastic. It must also retain a phylogenetic conception between ancestor-descendent pairs. A 
satisfactory account of homology and homoplasy is (1) phylogenetic and (2) strict. 
The taxic account here is taken as sufficient, if not necessary, for determination of homoplasy and homology. 
For instance, taxic homology as stated will not help us determine homology for the purposes of 
identifying novelties, as this does not concern sister-clades. Note that by ‘strict’ here I mean no overlaps – it 
might be okay for there to be a vague boundary between homology and homoplasy (traits being neither 
homologous nor homoplastic), but we must avoid overlaps – where a trait is both homoplastic and 
homologous. 
I have given three cases where the strict taxic division between homology and homoplasy must be 
retained to make sense of the epistemic use of the concepts, and another case where something like that 
distinction must be retained: 
 Trait Inference, where the use of homology is justified on grounds of ancestry, and use of 
homoplasy is justified on grounds of similar selective regimes 
 Adaptationist Explanation, where homology serves to ‘frame’ explanatory targets and homoplasy 
counts as corroborating evidence for hypotheses 
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 The Identification of Novelty, where a trait which lacks a homologue in an ancestor is novel (and thus 
worthy of evo-devo explanation) 
 Phylogenetic Reconstruction, where homologies count as data-points for common ancestry, while 
homoplasy is noise 
These are spread widely across biological practice: from molecular genetics, to systematics, evo-devo, 
evolutionary biology, and so on… any account which doesn’t capture these uses of homology and 
homoplasy should be rejected. 
In the next section I turn to a view on homology which falls afoul of this restriction as it takes some kinds 
of homoplasy as homologous. I will respond to the arguments presented for the view, before adapting my 
own version. 
III The Hierarchical View 
The ‘hierarchical view’ is an attractive take on the nature of homology. I take the main defender of the 
view to be Hall, but it is also expressed in Gould (2002), Ramsey & Peterson (2012) and Leander (2008). I 
take the view to have two main tenets: (1) homology and homoplasy can only be defined qua some ‘level’ 
of biological organization; (2) ‘homoplasy’ is not a unified category: those which are due to underlying 
developmental homologies, such as parallelisms and atavisms, are a form of homology, whereas true 
convergence is not. The view usually holds that so-called ‘deep-homologies’ – the retention of various 
‘master-control’ regulatory genes (such as pax6 and Foxp2) and their reuse across disparate clades – are 
importantly different from ‘shallower’ developmental continuities. This claim typically underlies the split 
between convergence and parallelisms. 
I am a hierarchist insofar as I agree with the first claim, but will demonstrate that the second claim is 
untenable. I also dispute the clean distinction between ‘deep homologies’ and other developmental 
constraints – preferring instead a context-dependent account. I focus on Ramsey & Peterson, as they 
provide the most general and rigorous version of the view. My argumentative strategy is simple: because 
the second part of the hierarchical view does not keep homology and homoplasy separate, it ought to be 
rejected. I also undermine the positive reasons for taking parallelisms as continuous with homology, and 
convergence separate. There are of course differences between these various accounts (for instance, Hall 
sees the space between homologies and parallelisms as a continuum, while Ramsey & Peterson do not), 
but the differences should not matter for the purposes at hand.  
The hierarchy view begins with the insight, made forcibly by Hall, that homologous relationships at 
different levels can be decoupled: “Homology at one level, for example a feature such as a limb, need not 
correspond to homology at other levels; the developmental processes that produce the limb, or the 
genetic cascades underlying those processes (Hall 2003 pp 416).” The upshot of this is that, in principle 
and frequently in practice, judgements of homology and homoplasy are independent: 
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…to identify the hierarchical level of homology and homoplasy being specified, we should always 
speak of ‘homologous as limbs, homologous as digits, homologous as developmental process, 
homologous as a gene network. Etc.,’ and ditto for ‘homoplastic as…,’ (pp425).” 
I am convinced and point the reader to Hall’s examples. Any claim of homology or homoplasy must be 
indexed to some level of description – qua ‘being winged’ bats and birds are homoplastic; qua ‘being 
quadrupedal’ bats and birds are homologous. This is extremely important for the epistemic uses I 
sketched in II: for the inference from the form and function of snake venom to carry over to 
Sinornithosaurus, it had better be the case that the homoplasies are at the ‘right level’. If the homoplasy is 
physiological – say the use of lengthened maxillary fangs to deliver venom, but not ‘ecological’ – used for 
eating birds, then the homoplasy is not evidence for the ecological hypothesis (although of course it could 
have an indirect bearing via supporting physiological reconstruction). 
Hierarchists also see homoplasy as disjunctive; some homoplasies are properly understood as 
homologous, and others are not. This is in part driven by a distinction between ‘deep homology’ and 
more directly shared developmental resources. Before responding to arguments for this way of dividing 
the space, it will be helpful to sketch Ramsey & Peterson’s articulation of the view. 
For Ramsey & Peterson, two traits are homologous when they meet two criteria. Trace the closest 
historical line between the two lineages. The common ancestor of Sinornithosaurus and Opisthoglyphous 
snakes lived in the deep past. The line between them shall be temporally long, tracing back to the most 
recent organism which unites the sister-clades. The line between my father and me will be much more 
direct: one step from myself to he. Some trait of the organisms is homologous just in case two conditions 
hold: (1) continuity: each step between the organisms and their most recent common ancestor must have 
the trait or be bridged by continuity homology one level lower; (2) correspondence: the traits must be the same 
trait (numerically identical) in each organism along the path. 
‘Correspondence’ fits into the analysis based on Ramsey & Paterson’s view that homologous relations 
must be relations of identity or sameness, as opposed to a similarity-relation. Remaining agnostic (for the 
purposes of this paper), I will replace it with a more liberal restriction in section IV. By ‘continuity’, there 
are two ways that traits may be homologous. Strictly, with no gaps between ancestors, and via bridging, 
where there is a ‘gap’ between the ancestor’s holding the trait, but there are homologues present one level 
lower. Imagine that the common ancestor of Opisthoglyphous snakes and Sinornithosaurus was not 
venomous, but ‘proto-venomous’ – the developmental requirements for venom are present, just awaiting 
the right trigger. In both lineages those triggers are fired and venom evolves. By the taxic account, their 
venom is not homologous – but by the hierarchy account they are – as the apparent gap is bridged by 
developmental homologues.   
The indexical nature of homology and homoplasy, and the lumping of some homoplasies as homologous 
falls out of these criteria. Consider the figure below (based on Ramsey & Peterson), which provides three 
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possible scenarios for the ancestral relationships between Sinornithosaurus and Opisthoglypous snakes. For 
simplicity’s sake, the figure only considers three levels of possible homology – the morphological, the 
‘developmental’ (the proximate developmental mechanisms responsible for a trait’s morphological 
expression) and the ‘deep’ (upstream developmental mechanisms which effect the expression of 
morphology indirectly). 
 
In the top left we see homology due to ‘strict’ continuity: long maxillary teeth are present in the most 
recent common ancestor of Sinornithosaurus and Opsithogylpous snakes, and are retained in both lineages. 
This is a standard homology by the taxic account. In the bottom-left quadrant we see a case where the 
common ancestor did not have long maxillary teeth, but both descendants evolved them utilizing the 
same resources at the developmental level. By the taxic account, this would be counted as homoplasy – 
but for the hierarchists, the developmental level ‘bridges’ the gap in level 1. This is a case of parallelism and 
counts as homologous for a hierarchist.  Finally in the top-right quadrant we see a failure of bridging – 
both lineages evolved the trait after the split from their common ancestor, and utilized similar deep 
resources (regulatory genes), but there is no continuity at the developmental level to bridge the gap. This 
is a case of convergence by their lights.  
And so from Ramsey & Peterson’s picture we get (1) indexing: homology can only be decided qua some 
level; (2) homoplastic disjunction: ‘parallel’ evolution is homologous, ‘convergence’ is not; (3) a split 
between ‘deep’ homologies and other developmental resources. It is clear that to deny 2 and 3 in this 
framework I must deny bridging and retain strict continuity. Adopting strict continuity would count the lower 
left and upper right cases as non-homologous, and deny the kind of separation we see between 
developmental and deep homologies. Ramsey & Paterson’s continuity criterion comes from their denial 
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of an independence thesis: that the identification of homology and homoplasy at different levels are 
independent. I argue that the independence thesis is necessary: first, reasons hierarchists provide for 
rejecting it are unconvincing; second, it clashes with the requirement that the taxic distinction between 
homology and homoplasy be respected. 
Hall attacks the idea of a unitary homoplastic category directly. It is unsatisfactory, as “… [homoplasies 
are] neither united by independent evolutionary history, nor by different developmental mechanisms 
forming the feature in different taxa. Consequently, homoplasy as a category is unsatisfactory, whether 
one thinks about homoplasy from a developmental or a phylogenetic point of view (2003, 418).” For 
Hall, then, homoplasies as a category must be united from either a developmental or phylogenetic 
context. I will criticize both in turn. 
His rejection of a developmental basis for uniting convergence and parallelism is rooted in the distinction 
between deep and shallow developmental homologies. If deep and shallow developmental homologies are 
saliently different, then this could undermine taking homoplasy unitarily. In standard parallel cases, we see 
similar characters evolve in two closely related lineages with the same (homologous) developmental 
resources being transformed in mechanistically similar (even identical) ways; while in standard convergent 
cases, we see similar characters evolve using divergent developmental resources. Different homoplasies 
could have different mechanistic explanations – and this undermines taking them as continuous. This is 
unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, because phenotypic homologies can be dependent upon divergent 
(non-homologous) developmental resources there is an analogous case for splitting homologies in two: by 
Hall’s own lights some homologies have different mechanistic explanations. Second, this assumes that the 
parallel/convergent divide ought to depend on the status of developmental homologies, which I deny in 
the next section.  
Hall takes homoplasy as divergent on phylogenetic grounds because parallelisms, like homologues, are 
due to modification of some pattern of descent, while convergence is truly independent: 
[homology & parallelism] reflect phylogenetic conservation or retention of features in organisms 
with common descent, independent of whether development has diverged, and… [convergence] 
reflects similar features resulting from independent evolution (2003, 423, italics removed) 
This follows from the idea that parallelisms are not truly independent. In parallel cases, development stymies 
the apparent independence, while in convergent cases it does not. And so: 
… when we are attempting to separate homology from homoplasy mechanistically, we are not 
dealing with a dichotomy between homoplasy as parallelism/convergence and homology as common descent… 
Rather we are dealing with common descent with modification, and, more specifically, with 
common descent with varying degrees of modification (2007, 476). 
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So Hall sees parallelisms and convergences as divergent phylogenetically because both homology and 
homoplasy are explained by common descent, while convergence is not. I agree that common descent is an 
important part of the explanation of many homoplasies, but deny that this is sufficient to think of 
parallelisms as a kind of homology. As I demonstrate, we can retain a strict divide between homoplasy 
and homology while incorporating the different explanatory resources required for parallelism and 
convergence. In addition, it is not obvious why this approach, which delineates homology and homoplasy 
in terms of how they are explained, ought to take precedence over the epistemic roles I have discussed. 
Moreover, I am suspicious of the idea that any convergence on earth is truly independent. For all we 
know, the basic structure of DNA underlying this generation-event places important constraints on 
morphological paths. If so, then all homoplasies are parallelisms by Hall’s reasoning. 
Another reason of Hall’s (see 2007) turns on the idea that homoplasy can be evidence of shared ancestry. 
I previously mentioned ‘swamping’ cases (such as climbing in plattyhrine monkeys). In such cases we 
might see the homoplasy as evidence of relatedness. Although the homoplasies do not allow us to work 
out the patterns of inheritance between the individual lineages, it could be taken as good evidence of 
shared ancestry in the group overall: 
Studies such as these [Lockwood’s] reinforce homoplasy as evidence of shared ancestry, even if 
that shared ancestry is embedded in the distant past (Hall 2007 475-476). 
Hall takes a parallel homoplasy (such as climbing), as good evidence of some group’s relatedness, whereas 
a truly convergent homoplasy is not. And so, for the purpose of identifying closely related groups, the 
strict homology/homoplasy distinction as captured by the taxic account fails. This is some reason to 
reject it, and moreover one which speaks to the methodology of this paper. 
It is not obvious to me that Hall is right that homoplastic clustering is evidence of shared ancestry, but 
even if it is I have two responses. First, why is this particular use important, compared to the cases I used 
to drive my defence of retaining the taxic division? Hall might be right that significant homoplasy signals 
a group’s ancestral clumping, but in order to actually work out the specific relationships between them, 
we need to divide the homologous from the homoplastic. If we collapse some homoplasies into 
homology, then we can identify related groups, but we cannot hypothesise specific patterns of descent. It 
strikes me that the utility of parallelisms here is too weak to drive Hall’s claim. 
Second, we can read frequent homoplasies as evidence of shared ancestry in virtue of the homoplasies 
being evidence for homologies at some lower level. If many microraptors homoplastically evolved 
Opoisthoglyphous venom, I would take this as evidence of them being closely related. But why? Because, 
given those homoplasies, they almost certainly share underlying developmental homologues – and those 
are evidence of shared ancestry. In other words, homologies are evidence of shared ancestry directly, 
while homoplasies are only evidence derivatively.  
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What direct reasons are there for rejecting the independence thesis? Ramsey & Peterson provide an 
argument which, if correct, would require us to abandon independence. The argument points to cases 
where the expression of the phenotype in question is not always actualized, leading to mischaracterizations 
of non-homologies if independence is retained. 
Consider the unique dominance displays performed by alpha males in a number of species. If we 
were to take two alpha males in one of these species and ask whether their dominance displays 
are homologous, operating under a strict rule of continuity, we would likely infer that the 
behaviors were not homologous. The reason is that there is a good chance that some of the 
ancestors (including the most recent ancestor) were not alpha males (since although the alpha 
males often do the bulk of the breeding, they do not do all of it). We thus need to appeal to 
interlevel dependency in our accounts in order to identify the behaviour of the alpha males as 
homologous (266) 
Because the immediate ancestor does not express dominance, it appears that under a strict continuity rule, 
we are required to take it as homoplastic. By taking common developmental resources into account, as 
hierarchists do, we correctly identify dominance as homologous. This should arise for any heritable trait 
with conditional expression: plenty to justify denying the independence thesis. 
Happily, denying independence is not our only route around this problem. I instead embrace a dispositional 
account of characters. We are not merely interested in the phenotype actually expressed, but in the range of 
expressions under a variety of conditions. Something like: 
Lineage x possesses character y just in case, under the right environmental/developmental conditions, x 
would express y 
This is not intended to be a complete analysis of when a lineage possesses a character (that would be a 
difficult task indeed) but rather a sketch of a restriction – whatever story we want to tell about character 
possession, it had better be dispositional. ‘Silver-backed’ is a trait expressed by alpha males in gorilla 
populations, but we need not take this as homoplastic between silver-backed cousins of non-silver-backed 
ancestors as under the right conditions, those parents would have expressed ‘silver-backed’.  A dispositional account of 
characters gets around Ramsey & Peterson’s concern without denying independence. Moreover, surely a 
dispositional account of phenotype is independently advantageous. There is an important difference 
between, say, a male clownfish who has the developmental potential to become female in the right 
conditions, and a defective male who cannot. These differences are important for explaining their 
divergent fitness. Likewise, a non-dominant gorilla who, given changes to his harem’s hierarchy, would 
grow silver on his back is different from one who (through some defect) would not – even if neither 
actually becomes dominant. In explaining phenotype expression, we are interested in more than what is 
actually expressed, but also in what could be expressed – and this leads us to a dispositional view. 
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There is no good reason for denying the independence thesis. Different homoplasies have different 
developmental bases, but that is not sufficient to undermine independence. Some (but not all) 
homoplasies are evidence for shared ancestry – but they cannot tell us about particular ancestors and tell 
us this in virtue of signalling developmental homologues. We can deal with problem cases like 
conditional-phenotype-expression by appealing to a dispositional account of characters. Moreover, there 
are important reasons to retain the thesis. 
A worry which emerges from denying independence is the spectre of subjectivism, which creeps into 
homology and homoplasy identification due to ‘level counting’. To know if a trait is homologous or not, I 
must refer to levels other than the target. I must determine which level is ‘one lower’ than the target. How 
can we determine the levels which are referred to? Without a non-arbitrary story of determining which 
levels ought to be represented, the convergence-parallelism distinction becomes arbitrary. In addition, 
What is to stop me from adding or removing levels? In figure 1, am I forced to represent the case as three 
levelled? If I removed the developmental (2nd) level, then the case in the upper right quadrant would 
count as parallel as the ‘deep’ level would bridge. I could add levels as well. By retaining independence, we 
no longer need to refer to other levels in identifying homologies and homoplasies – and so such 
subjectivism doesn’t emerge from that avenue at least. We might still refer to other levels in explaining 
homology and homoplasy of course. As we shall see, my account will favour a causal/explanatory reading 
of parallelisms which proceeds from rather than being prior to judgments of ancestral relations. 
Most importantly for this paper, rejecting the independence thesis clashes with the restriction from 
section II. By that claim, homology and homoplasy by the taxic account must be, at the very least, sufficient 
(if not necessary) for determining the relationship between two traits. This is justified on the grounds that 
the taxic distinction is required to make sense of many evidential uses in the comparative method. By the 
taxic account, homology and homoplasy are determined purely phylogenetically. Two traits are 
homologous just in case the trait is present in the most recent common ancestor. By the hierarchy 
account, this knowledge is not sufficient to determine the traits’ status – as it cannot decide between the 
upper-left and lower-left quadrants of figure 1. Phylogenetic information alone is insufficient; we must 
also look at other levels. This collapses homology and some homoplasies together – obscuring the 
important, and different, roles they play in the comparative method. 
IV The Strict Hierarchy View and Parallelisms 
So far, I have argued for observing a strict delineation between homology and homoplasy along broadly 
taxic terms and argued, pace the hierarchy view, that we ought to retain the independence thesis. In this 
section, I outline the view which keeps the indexing of hierarchy, but also independence: call it strict 
hierarchy. By this view, judgements of homology and homoplasy can only be made qua some level of 
description; but judgements of homology and homoplasy at some level are independent of judgments on 
any other levels. Following that I turn to parallelisms. 
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Strict Hierarchy 
The ‘strict hierarchy’ view is similar to the hierarchy view, but denies the dependence thesis. It also 
replaces Ramsey & Paterson’s ‘correspondence’ requirement with something more liberal. 
Two similar traits are homologous if and only if, when drawing the shortest path of relatedness between the holders of those 
traits (i) there is strict continuity; (ii) there is correspondence of salient similarity-relations 
‘Strict Continuity’ is simply Ramsey & Paterson’s first requirement without bridging. This version of 
‘correspondence’ differs from theirs in that it does not require a sameness relation. I suspect that quibbling 
about whether homologies need to be ‘the same’ or ‘similar’ is beside the point – but not just any 
similarity is sufficient. I opt to leave what counts as a ‘salient’ similarity relation for later work, but they 
will be whichever similarities are important for determining homology. Two reasons Ramsey & Paterson 
provide for taking homology as a relation of identity rather than similarity is first, that some homologues 
are not particularly similar (swim bladders and lungs, for instance) and second, that homologous 
relationships are transitive like identity relations, while similarity relations are not necessarily so. Although 
I require correspondence in terms of ‘similarity’, the restriction to salience is supposed to answer these 
worries. It is true that many homologues are not similar, but they are similar in the relevant respects. Both 
lungs and swim bladders, for instance, have a ‘transformative’ similarity (see Griffiths & Brigandt 2007) 
and a similarity in ancestry. If homology relationships are logically similar to identity relationships, then 
the similarities which count will reflect this – perhaps only transitive ones will do. Much more remains to 
be said on this issue, but I leave that for future work. This view answers some of the issues we have seen 
with the standard hierarchy view. 
First, this gives us the right story about cases one, two and four from section II. In inferring traits, 
supporting adaptive explanations and phylogenetic reconstruction we require homology and homoplasy 
be divided along taxic lines. By strict hierarchy, the traits of two sister-clades will be homologous if held 
by their most recent common ancestor (qua some level of description), and homoplastic if not. The taxic 
divisions necessitated by those inferential and explanatory uses are retained. 
Second, we get the right story for the identification of novelties. There, we require a strict delineation 
between homology and non-homology in ancestor-descendent pairs. By strict hierarchy the evolution of 
venom in Sinornithosaurus would count as a novelty just in case that trait is not present in the 
Sinornithosaurus’ immediate ancestor. Allowing for some grey areas in terms of ‘immediacy’ and ‘proto-
traits’ (presumably poison evolved gradually), this meets the needs of evo-devo. 
Third, we needn’t concern ourselves with ‘level-counting’ in determining homology and homoplasy. 
Although traits are homologous or homoplastic qua some level of description – and we might disagree 
about appropriate explanatory targets – once we have a target in focus, we need only concern ourselves 
with phylogenetic relationships to determine homology and homoplasy. 
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There is still a major challenge facing this account: serial homologues. I take it my left and right hands are 
homologues, but there is no phylogenetic relationship between them I could appeal to, to make them so 
by this account. One option, in the spirit of Griffiths’ pluralism, would be to agree that in terms of 
phenomena, within-organism (serial) and between-organism homologies are continuous; both are part of 
the same ‘investigative kind’. But we explain them with separate resources; some other account of 
homology is required for that task. Another route, as Ramsey & Peterson attempt, is to build on the 
current account to incorporate serial homologues. I leave a full exploration of these options for later 
work. 
Parallelisms 
The main difference between a strict hierarchist and views like Hall’s is the classification of parallelisms. 
For the standard hierarchist, parallelisms are homologous as they are bridged: homologous resources one 
level below are responsible for the apparent homoplasy. The strict hierarchist does not distinguish 
between parallelisms and convergences as so far stated: all are homoplastic, neither is homologous. 
However, the difference between parallelism and convergence is important. For instance, cases of parallel 
evolution can provide a stronger basis for postulating robust regularities across closely related clades 
(Currie 2012a, Gould 2002). For one thing, closely related lineages are more likely to share developmental 
resources, and are thus more likely to respond similarly to selective pressures. Hypotheses about the 
evolutionary effect of environment on evolution are less likely to be stymied by developmental noise. The 
thought is that lineages which share developmental constraints are more likely to respond similarly to 
environmental pressures, making adaptive generalizations easier. A final task for this paper, then, is to 
distinguish parallelisms from convergences. 
Keeping with the methodology so far, we should ask: why do we care about the distinction between 
parallel and convergent homoplasy? What epistemological work does it do? The usual answer is the 
perennial question of externalism vs internalism in shaping evolutionary form (Godfrey-Smith 1996):  
Gould’s concern about the role or otherwise of natural selection in macro-evolution (Gould 1997). For 
the externalist, environmental factors play a central role in constraining the pathways open to evolution; 
the internalist emphasizes internal constraints, such as development. Some externalists cite wide-spread 
convergence as evidence for their thesis (Conway-Morris 2003, McGhee 2011). But this turns on the 
convergences’ independence from internal constraint: if homoplasies are explained by restrictions due to 
the developmental resources evolution has to work with, then homoplasy is no evidence for externalists.  
A more prosaic reason for caring about parallelisms versus convergences is described in Currie 2012a. 
Cases of convergence are cited to support specific adaptive hypotheses (as opposed to the role of natural 
selection generally). Gong et al’s speculation that Sinornithosaurus’ long fangs are an adaptation for biting 
through feathers could be supported by pointing to a homoplasy. Perhaps some other lineage uses its 
fangs similarly. How convincing is this? That depends. If the relationship is parallel, we should expect the 
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two lineages to be more similar than if the relationship is convergent. Prima facie, the more (relevantly) 
similar the lineages, the more likely it is that differences or similarities between them will be due to 
selective regimes. Citing a parallelism (as opposed to a convergence) to defend an adaptationist model 
controls for developmental noise by lessening the scope of the inference. Given the ubiquity of appeals to 
convergence in evolutionary biology, this gives good reason to care about the distinction. Note that I am 
not claiming here that parallelism is better evidence than convergence. Indeed, a convergent trait between 
very distantly related lineages is remarkable and could be very strong evidence for adaptation. The point is 
that inferring between parallelisms is more secure (or at least more tractable) than between convergences. This 
is because the phylogenetic and developmental similarity between parallelisms controls for noise from 
these sources2.  
So, we want an account of parallelisms and convergence which brings out the important aspect of the 
distinction: a convergent homoplasy is largely constrained by external factors, factors like the environment 
do the explanatory work; a parallel homoplasy is largely constrained by internal factors, developmental 
constraints, or phenotypic limitations, do the explanatory work. 
As we have seen, hierarchists define parallel homoplasies in terms of development: if there is a bridge on 
the developmental level uniting two homoplastic traits, then it is parallel. There are other accounts which 
explicitly link the role of development to defining parallelisms. Powell (2007) for instance, draws the 
distinction between parallel and convergent in terms of putative parallel developmental resources being 
screened off (in Salmon 1984’s sense) by upstream processes. Pearce (2012), Wake et al (2011) and Gould 
(2002) also provide development-based accounts. Powell (2012) and Currie (2012a) both suggest that 
parallelisms and convergences can be divided by whether the underlying developmental pathway is a 
difference-maker.  
In the account provided here, I follow up on the ‘difference maker’ concept and do not tie the concept to 
development. 
Why not just development? 
                                                          
2
 Part of the justification of this turns on an empirical claim about the relative similarity, and level of constraint, 
between convergences and parallelisms. Following Gould and Griffiths, I think that functional continuities are 
relatively coarse, while ancestral continuities are finer grained - convergent similarities are ‘shallow’, while 
parallel similarities are ‘deep’. If that is right, then because developmental continuities tightly constrain the 
space of possible phenotype expression, I should be quite confident in inferring between model and target. 
Moreover, shallow similarities probably belie less constraint in phenotype expression, meaning that 
projectability from model to target is less secure (see Currie 2012b for discussion of the ‘shallowness 
problem’). This claim, then, is merely ceteris paribus and based on the empirical claim that most of the time, 
functional similarities are shallower than ancestral ones. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on 
this point. 
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As outlined above, most accounts of parallelisms are explicitly tied to the idea of development. I certainly 
don’t want an account which excludes homoplasies being due to developmental factors, but think there is 
good reason to want something broader. 
First, the parallelism-convergence distinction is interested in constraint – and I suspect constraint can come 
from places other than development. Phenotype, it seems to me, can constrain evolution as surely as 
development. Why, for instance, are there comparatively few large mammals dwelling on islands 
compared to birds? Surely this is due to the comparative difficulty large mammals face when trying to 
reach islands, and this is due to their phenotype. This doesn’t look like selection: there is no selection 
pressure on animals to reach islands. As a developmental constraint lowers the likelihood of some new 
mutation arising in a population, a ‘phenotype constraint’ lowers the likelihood of a population reaching 
some environment (to be shaped by whatever environmental pressures are there)3. The island example is 
a legitimate case of constraint based on phenotype. It is schematic, and making this point fully would 
require much more detail, but I take it to provide proof of possibility and at least motivate a non-
developmental take (see Pearce 2011b for further discussion of non-developmental constraints)4. 
Second, in some scientific contexts we lack epistemic access to developmental information. 
Palaeobiologists, in particular, could make good use of a parallel-convergent distinction, but have only the 
most indirect ways of knowing the developmental homologues between their targets. If the relation 
between Sinornithosaurus and rear-fanged snakes is indeed homoplastic, how are we to determine whether 
this is due to underlying developmental constraints? Scotland (2011) criticizes Gouldian accounts of the 
distinction on a similar basis: we rarely have access to the developmental information required – and 
moreover phenotype cannot act as a proxy (because development and phenotype are frequently 
decoupled). An account which accommodates taking parallelisms as due to either development or 
phenotype (or whatever else fits the bill) gets around this problem as we are free to hypothesize about 
internal constraint without determining developmental relationships. We should prefer an account which 
is more easily usable by palaeobiologists and still meets the needs of neontologists. The difference making 
approach I suggest does not, of course, make things easy for palaeontologists. But it does make things 
somewhat easier: developmental information is included in the set of possible constraints, but other routes 
                                                          
3
 But surely a lineage’s phenotype is as it is in part due to its genotype? Why don’t phenotypic constraints 
collapse into developmental constraints? Here’s why: in cases of developmental constraint, the developmental 
system’s inability to achieve certain forms constrains morphospace. In phenotypic constraint, it is the 
phenotypic failings to (for instance) fly to islands which explain why certain evolutionary paths are closed. 
Naturally part of the proximate explanation of why any particular phenotype is as it is appeals to 
developmental systems, but ‘being flightless’ is multiple realizable across such systems. In cases of phenotypic 
constraint, it is phenotype, not development, which explains the contrast (thanks to Kim Sterelny and an 
anonymous referee for pressing this point) 
4
 A referee points out that structural constraints (for instance, those which appeal to geometry) could, if they 
are classed as internal, count as parallelisms without any developmental at all. How we precisely delineate 
internal and external constraints, and what to say about structural constraints, is left for further investigation. 
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of investigation are also open. Being free to call upon a wider set of concerns in establishing parallelism 
makes the concepts more amenable to use in palaeobiological contexts. 
Third, and most speculatively, we might want to extend concepts of parallelism outside of usual biological 
contexts. Most obviously, cultural evolution might make use of the parallelism/convergence distinction – 
and tying the account to development restricts such extensions. The nature of the hierarchical account 
conflicts with tying parallelisms merely to one level-relations and surely there are potentially interesting 
homoplasies at each putative level.  
Why difference making? 
I approach homoplasy as an explanatory and inferential concept: it explains biological similarity and 
supports biological hypotheses. On one reading of Gong et al, the lengthened maxillaries between 
Sinornithosaurus and rear-fanged snakes are homoplastic: they independently evolved similar traits. But 
what explains their convergence? Presumably some combination of internal and external constraints (c.f 
McGhee 2011, Griffiths 1994, Sansom 2003). It could be that something about Sinornithosaur and snake 
physiology, morphology or development makes the evolution of long fangs likely: the homologous 
intrinsic properties of the lineages constrain occupiable morphospace. It could be instead that common 
environmental pressures carry the majority of the burden: snakes and Sinornithosaurus both underwent 
strong enough selection to force them into similar parts of morphospace. Parallelisms and convergences 
pick out this continuum. The parallel or convergent nature of the homoplasy makes a difference to which 
inferences are supported. If the two lineages are too different in terms of internal constraints, then this 
can stymie the effect of common selective pressures.  If the similarity is largely due to tight internal 
constraints, the inferential basis will ceteris paribus be stronger, although the scope of the inference will be 
restricted to lineages with those internal constraints.  
Difference-making accounts of explanation and causation lean on the thought that some counterfactual 
dependencies are special: they make a difference to the occurrence of the phenomena we are interested in. 
Roughly, some variable x is a difference maker to some output y just in case, if we were to intervene on x, 
while holding all other variables fixed (other than those downstream of x), this would change y (see 
Woodward 2003). Say that Gong et al are correct in their speculation that Sinornithosaurus preyed on early 
birds. Their claim that lengthened maxillaries evolved in order to pierce through feathers and deliver a 
poisonous bite can be read as a counterfactual claim. If Sinornithosaurus did not prey on birds, then they 
would not have lengthened maxillaries. What makes this interesting is the idea that selection for a bird-
eating niche is a difference maker for that morphological trait. If we hold Sinornithosaurus history fixed, but 
tweak bird hunting, would they have shorter maxillaries? If their teeth would still be long, then Gong et 
al’s speculation is false. If they would have had shorter teeth, then we are onto something. 
Difference-making has the potential to pick out the right distinction between internal and external factors 
we want for the parallel-convergent distinction. After all, we want something to be parallel just in case 
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internal factors make a difference, and convergent when external factors make a difference. However, 
difference making on its own is far too broad a category: even if some factor plays a minor role, it can still 
count as a difference maker. Perhaps if Sinornithosaurus did not inhabit a bird-hunting niche their fangs 
would be a tiny bit shorter – then bird hunting makes a difference to fang-length, but far too 
insignificantly for us to declare this a convergence rather than a parallelism.  I think Woodward’s (2010) 
‘causal specificity’, which draws on Waters’ ‘actual difference makers’ (2007), and Lewis (2000)’s notion of 
‘influence’ is a good candidate for dividing the two. My story is similar to Powell’s 2012 (he draws on 
Waters) – but differs as I discuss below. 
For any particular homoplasy, some combination of internal factors and external factors will explain the 
similarity (there should be a third variable: chancy, coincidental similarity, but for simplicities sake I leave 
this out).  Lewis’ notion of influence, which Woodward develops, is the idea that some variable (call it v1) 
effects another (call it v2) systematically. In Woodward’s terms, there is some mapping function (F) which 
connects interventions on v1 with one-one changes in v2. Bird-hunting would influence fang-length in 
Sinornithosaurus if, were we to make changes to Sinornithosaurus hunting behaviour (reduce or increase their 
dependency on bird-hunting), the average length of fang would shift a specific amount for each change in 
bird hunting. Specificity, then, controls for redundancy: if a wide number of shifts in one variable make no 
(or little) difference to the outcome, then it is not specific. I will sketch how we might use specificity to 
determine the parallel or convergent nature of a parallelism. 
Any particular homoplasy will be due to some measure of internal and external variables held in common 
between the lineages the homoplasies occur in. For some homoplasy H, take the set of internal variables 
held in common {i1, i2, i3… in} and the set of external variables held in common {e1, e2, e3… en} and 
determine the specificity for each variable. This will tell us how much redundancy exists for the internal 
set and the external set. If the specificity of set {i1, i2, i3… in} is higher than set {e1, e2, e3… en}, then the H 
is ‘parallel’, if lower then it is a convergence, if they are equal, then it is indeterminate.  
Let’s run the account through a toy test case (also used in Powell 2012). The evolution of lens-eyes in 
mammals and cephalopods is a striking homoplasy between two distantly related lineages. Infamously, 
both lineages utilize homologous homeobox genes (pax6) in eye development. Is the development 
homologue sufficiently constraining for the phenotypic homoplasy to count as parallel? Pax6 controls for 
eye tokens rather than types: the insertion of a human pax6 into a cephalopod developmental system, if it 
had any effect at all, would result in extra cephalopod eyes, rather than human ones. Moreover, the gene is 
utilized in non-lens eyes such as those of insects. This ought lead us to conclude that Pax6 does not 
constrain eye evolution sufficiently to count as parallel. And this is the result which my account provides. 
Pax6 is most likely a difference maker in the evolution of eyes overall (it certainly is in the development of 
eyes), but it lacks specificity. In development at least, Pax6 is extremely redundant: changes in states to 
the gene operate like an on-off switch. The redundancy of Pax6 (assuming that the other internal 
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variables are similar) would suffice for the phenotypic homoplasy between mammal and cephalopod eyes 
to come out convergent rather than parallel. 
Here are a few nice features of this account. First, it allows a smooth gradient between parallel and 
convergence – as stated, it is (near) binary but in practice I take it that a parallelism will be one where the 
specificity of the internal set significantly outweighs the specificity of the external set. Second, it doesn’t 
require that the internal set be developmental only – it allows for cases of phenotypic restriction, and 
could easily be utilized in cases of cultural evolution. Third, it gives us the answers we want. ‘Master-
control’ genes (such as Pax6) don’t seem to be constraining enough to provide parallelisms – the mere 
utilization of Pax6 doesn’t give us any reason to think that a particular eye will develop, as it is used for a 
wide variety. But this is just to say that, qua eye-type, Pax6 is extremely redundant.  
Arednt & Reznik (2007) and Pearce (2012) think there is a general difficulty with tying accounts of 
convergence and parallelism to the sorts of philosophical analyses usually reserved for causation. Most 
model causation as linear – and developmental systems just don’t work like that. Powell’s account, for 
instance, relies on a distinction between ‘distal’ and ‘proximate’ developmental causes to distinguish 
convergences and parallelisms. This is stymied by the sheer complexity of developmental systems. In 
response, we might admit that scientific representations of such systems are inevitably idealized in some 
ways, and so might frequently be represented as linear systems. However, in principle at least, reliance on 
a difference-making account does not rely on such ‘proximate’ or ‘distal’ causes: all that matters is the 
causal specificity – and this does not require linear systems. It doesn’t matter how tortured the causal route 
between the variables, if it can approach some functional mapping between states of the variable and the 
outcome, then it will be causally specific. Moreover, as my account relies on the aggregate specificity of 
internal and external factors, as a heuristic in distinguishing parallelisms from convergences we could 
black box such complexities. 
Another objection, which Pearce (2012) points at Powell’s account, is from operationalization. Roughly, can 
we expect scientists to perform the interventions which appear to be required to determine (in my case) 
the specificity of such internal factors? As Pearce points out, in some cases (particularly in terms of 
developmental systems which include feedback loops) it isn’t obvious whether ‘holding fixed’ ‘upstream’ 
variables is possible (as they are also downstream). I hope it is obvious that I don’t (at all!) expect 
palaeobiologists to be able to perform anything approaching an intervention to determine the relationship 
between bird hunting and tooth length. But this is a standard problem for palaeobiologists, and one 
which I think they share with neontologists and other scientists. Sometimes we simply do not have 
experimental access to our targets. Happily, the use of the comparative method, modelling and 
simulations, and other more ‘indirect’ routes can grant epistemic access to such counterfactuals. Gong et 
al’s appeal to snake phenotype (when read homoplastically) is precisely such a case. They are unable to 
determine directly whether long fangs are necessary for venom (as they cannot manipulate their extinct 
target), but reference to other venomous lineages gives reason to think that, if we were able to, such a link 
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would be established. Even if proposals such as my own and Powell’s cannot be operationalized in this 
sense, they can be inferred nonetheless. This complaint can be pushed further: just how can we know that, 
say, the specificity of the complete set of internal constraints affecting eye evolution across cephalopods 
and mammals is less than the specificity of the external constraints? A full response to this complaint 
would involve too detailed a discussion of biology’s epistemic resources to be made here, but I repeat 
myself: such knowledge can be slowly patched together indirectly. 
Powell draws on Water’s distinction (similar to Woodward’s) of ‘specific’ versus ‘general’ cause. His 2012 
builds that into his account – “… a homoplasy is a parallelism iff some of its proximate developmental 
machinery is both homologous and causally specific (369).” This account faces challenges mine avoids. First, it 
is tied to development. Second, it relies on our determining what ‘proximate’ might mean. Third, why 
should we think the proximate cause is the most constraining (c.f Pearce 2012)? In distinguishing parallel 
from convergent homoplasy, we target internal versus external constraints. Is there a good reason to think 
that a cause’s being proximate is more likely to make it more constraining? My hunch is that more often 
than not this is the case – but certainly not reliably, particularly in non-linear systems. However, Powell’s 
approach and mine are clearly close kin. As Powell says, “The key to distinguishing parallelism from 
convergence is that it is not the extent of developmental homology involved, but rather the causal type, that 
counts (369).” I mostly agree – but deny that developmental homology is necessary, and don’t restrict ‘causal 
types’ to proximate causes. 
And so, a difference-making account has the potential to deliver the goods. Causally specific factors will 
be constraining in the desired fashion, picking out internal versus external constraint and, in principle at 
least, it can deal with non-linear systems. 
Conclusion 
I have introduced a novel set of concerns for delineating homology and homoplasy. Examining biological 
practice, we see that a strict, phylogenetic delineation between homology and homoplasy is required to 
make sense of appeals to comparative evidence in biology. I also provided a novel conception of 
homology and homoplasy which retains the indexed nature characteristic of the hierarchy approach, but 
takes the concepts as independent – we need not appeal to other levels when delineating homology from 
homoplasy. Phylogenetic information suffices. I finally offered an account of parallelisms and 
convergences which respect their biological use. By defining them in terms of their causal role, we both 
capture the internal vs external requirements of that use, and allow the distinction to be made without 
appeal to developmental resources. 
There is still work to be done. Strict Hierarchy does not give us a story about serial homology, and how 
the account interacts with the concepts’ histories, and approaches which focus on homology as 
explanatory target have not been explored here. 
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If we are to understand applications of the comparative method exemplified in work such as Gong et al’s 
discussion of Sinornithosaur venom, we had better ensure that central concepts such as homology and 
homoplasy are illuminative of such uses.  
 Bibliography 
Amundson, R. Lauder, G. (1994). "Function without purpose: the uses of causal role function in 
evolutionary biology." Biol Philos 9(4): 443-470. 
Arendt, J., & Reznick, D. (2007). Convergence and parallelism reconsidered: what have we learned about 
the genetics of adaptation? Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 23(1), 26–32. 
Brigandt, I & Griffiths, P (2007) “The importance of homology for biology and philosophy”. Biology and 
Philosophy 22 (5):633-641 (2007) 
Brigandt, I & Love, A (2012). “Conceptualizing Evolutionary Novelty: Moving Beyond Definitional 
Debates.” Journal of Experimental Zoology 318(6):417-427 
Brigandt, I. (2007). "Typology now: homology and developmental constraints explain evolvability." Biol 
Philos 22: 709-725. 
Brown, R (2013). “What Evolvability Really Is”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 64(3) 
Conway Morris, S. (2003). Life's solution : inevitable humans in a lonely universe. Cambridge, UK ; New 
York, Cambridge University Press. 
Currie, A & Levy, A (forthcoming) Model species are not (theoretical) models, British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science  
Currie, A (2012a), Convergence as Evidence, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. (online first)  
Currie, A (2012b), Convergence, Contingency & Morphospace. Biology & Philosophy. Biology and 
Philosophy 27 (4):583-593. 
Gianechini, F.A., F.L. Agnolı´n, and M.D. Ezcurra. 201. A reassessment of the purportedly venom 
delivery system of the bird-like raptor Sinornithosaurus. Pala¨ontologische Zeitschrift. 
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (1996). Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Gong, E., L.D. Martin, D.A. Burnham, and A.R. Falk (2011) Evidence for a venomous Sinornithosaurus 
Pala¨ontol Z (2011) 85:109–111  
 
28 
 
Gong, E., L.D. Martin, D.A. Burnham, and A.R. Falk. 2009. The birdlike raptor Sinornithosaurus was 
venomous. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107: 766–768 
Gould, SJ. (2002). The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, Harvard University Press. 
Gould, SJ. (1989). Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History. W W Norton & co. 
Griffiths, Paul E. (2007). The phenomena of homology. Biology and Philosophy 22 (5):643-658. 
Griffiths, Paul E. (2006). Function, homology, and character individuation. Philosophy of Science 73 
(1):1-25. 
Griffiths, P. E. (1994). "Cladistic Classification and Functional Explanation." Philosophy of Science 61(2): 
206-227. 
Hall, B. K. (2012). Parallelism, deep homology, and evo-devo. Evol. & Devel. 14, 39-33 
Hall, B. K (2007). Homoplasy and homology: dichotomy or continuum?  J Hum Evol. 2007 
May;52(5):473-9.  
Hall, Brian K. (2005), “Consideration of the Neural Crest and Its Skeletal Derivatives in the Context of 
Novelty/Innovation”, Journal of Experimental Zoology, Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution 
304 (6): 548–557. 
Hall, B. K. (2003) Descent with modification: the unity underlying homology and homoplasy as seen 
through an analysis of development and evolution. Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc. 2003 Aug;78(3):409-33. 
Leander, Brian (2008) Different modes of convergent evolution reflect phylogenetic distance: a reply to 
Arendt and Reznik. Trends Ecol Evol (9):481-2 
Lewis, David (2000) Causation as Influence. The Journal of Philosophy , Vol. 97, No. 4, pp. 182-197 
Lockwood, CA. (1999) “Homoplasy and adaptation in the atelid postcranium”. Am. J. Phys. Anthropol. 
108: 459-482 
McGhee, G. R. (2011). Convergent evolution : limited forms most beautiful. Cambridge, Mass., MIT 
Press. 
Neander, Karen (2002), “Types of Traits: The Importance of Functional Homologues”, in Andre Ariew, 
Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and 
Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 390–415. 
Pearce, Trevor (2012) Convergence and Parallelism in Evolution: A Neo-Gouldian Account. Brit. J. Phil. 
Sci. 63, 429-448 
29 
 
Pearce, Trevor (2011b) Evolution and Constraints on Variation: Variant Specification and Range of 
Assessment. Philosophy of Science (78)739-751 
Powell, Russell (2012). Convergent evolution and the limits of natural selection. European Journal for 
Philosophy of Science 2 (3):355-373. 
Powell, R. (2007). "Is convergence more than an analogy? Homoplasy and its implications for 
macroevolutionary predictability." Biology and Philosophy 22(4): 565-578 
Ramsey, G & Peterson, A. (2012) Sameness in Biology. Philosophy of Science, 79 (2) pp 255-275 
Roth, Louise (1991). Homology and hierarchies: Problems solved and unresolved. Journal of 
Evolutionary Biology, 4 (2) pp 167-194 
Rosenberg, Alex & Neander, Karen (2009). Are homologies (selected effect or causal role) function free? 
Philosophy of Science 76 (3):307-334. 
Rosenberg, Alex (2006), Darwinian Reductionism; or, How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular 
Biology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Salmon, Wesley (1984), Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton:Princeton 
University Press. 
Sansom, R. (2003). "Constraining the adaptationism debate." Biology and Philosophy 18: 493-512. 
Scotland, Robert W (2011). What is parallelism? Evolution & Development 13:2, 214–227 
Wagner, G.P (1994), Homology and the Mechanisms of Development. In B.K Hall (ed.), Homology: The 
Heirarchical Basis of Comparative Biology, Academic Press, San Diego, pp 273-299 
Wake, D. B., M. H.Wake, and C. D. Specht. 2011. Homoplasy: from detecting pattern to determining 
process and mechanism of evolution. Science 331:1032–1035. 
Waters, K. (2007). Causes that make a difference. Journal of Philosophy, 104, 551–579. 
West-Eberhard, Mary Jane (2003), Developmental Plasticity and Evolution. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Woodward, James (2010). Causation in biology: Stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of 
explanation. Biology and Philosophy 25 (3):287-318 
Woodward, James (2003): Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Van Valen, Leigh (1982) Homology and Causes. Journal of Morphology, 172 (3) pp 305-312 
